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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

17625

ROBERT R. SATHER and
BONNIE LEE SATHER,
Def.end.ants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
In this action defendants, as counterclaimants, seek
to recover, pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimants Statute,
Section 57-6-1 et. seg. Utah Code Annotated, for improvements,
made to real property which was the subject matter of prior
proceedings between these same parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants' counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice
by the Honorable David Sam,

in Uintah County,

Judge for the Fourth District Court

State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff, respondent, seeks affirmation of the
Order of Dismissal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of an earlier action between
these same parties wherein ownership of the real property, same
as is involved in the present action and known generally as the
"Moss Ranch," was contested.

In the earlier action, upon a trial

before a jury in 1978, it was determined that defendants had
acted wilfully and maliciously against plaintiff, Ute-Cal, in
wrongfully

obtaining a deed to said property in March, 1974.

It was further determined that plaintiff was the rightful owner
of this property.

These findings were upheld on appeal.

Ute~~

Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P. 2d 1240 (Utah 1980).
After defendants had wrongfully obtained the deed to
Moss Ranch, and while in possession of same, they allegedly made
certain improvements upon the property.

Said improvements are

now the basis of defendants' counterclaim pursuant to Utah's
Occupying Claimant statute, Section 57-6-1 et. seg. Utah Code
Annotated.
Defendants' counterclaim was separated from the 1978
trial on the issues of ownership and damages related thereto, and
reserved for later determination.

Plaintiff filed a motion to

dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds that defendants' wilfull
and malicious misconduct against plaintiff's interest in the
property precluded any claim pursuant to Utah's Occupying Claimant
statute.

In February, 1981, an order granted by Honorable David

Sam, Judge in the fourth District Court for Uintah County,
dismissed defendants' counterclaim.
Plaintiff seeks an affirmation of the lower Court's
Order of Dismissal.
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--ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS, AS COUNTERCLAIMANTS, ARE PRECLUDED FROM
MAINTAINING AN ACTION UNDER THE OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS STATUTE BY
THEIR PRIOR WILFUL AND MALICIOUS MISCONDUCT IN ACQUIRING TITLE TO
THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LAWSUIT.
(a) To maintain a claim pursuant to the Utah Occupying
Claimants statute, a claimant must first establish (1)

that he had

color of title to the real property in question, and (2)
in good faith, made valuable improvements thereon.
Utah Code Annotated.

that he,

Section 57-6-1

A liberal definition of who is deel'1ed to have

color of title, for purposes of the Occupying Claimant statute, is
provided in Section 57-6-4; "good faith," however, is not specifically defined for purposes of the statute.
In 41 Am. Jur.

2d §17, at 492, it is suggested that

for purposes of such statutes as here in question, "good faith
means simply a reasonable and honest belief of the occupant in
his right or title, or, in other words, his freedom from a design
to defraud the party having the better title.n
consistent with Utah case law.

This position is

An instruction on good faith

upheld in Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180,
at 1182 (_1915), and cited again as a fair statement of Utah law by
Justice Crockett in Erickson v. Stoker, 120 Utah 653, 237 P. 2d
1012, at 1013

(1951), stated that the question of good faith will

depend on whether »at the time all the improvements were being made
the defendant honestly believed

it owned the property."

The affidavit presented by defendant SATHER asserts
that at the time the improvements were made he believed he was the
owner of the property in question.

Defendants also assert, properly
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that whether such subjective belief was "honest" and sufficient
to establish "good faith" is a question of fact to be determined
by all the facts and circumstances of the case.

In the case at

bar, however, the most crucial fact, determined in a prior
proceeding between these parties and determinative of the issue
here, was that the defendants had acquired title by wilful and
malicious misconduct against plaintiff and plaintiff's interest
in said property.

See Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather,

605 P. 2d 1240 (Utah 1980).

While defendants might subjectively

believe they could and did obtain ownership of the property by
such wrongful means, that belief in these circumstances should
not be construed to be an "honest belief" nor sufficient to raise
the issue of good faith.
One who acts in good faith acts with honest intentions.
The defendants' assertion, that despite having acquired title by
wrongful means in 1974, it was with an honest belief that they
were the rightful owners of said property when they made improvements in 1975, is on its face inconsistent with honest intention
or good faith.

Defendants, however, assert that there is yet a

question of fact regarding good faith, that in effect the above
inconsistency can be explained by a change in circumstances.
The affidavit presented by defendant SATHER claims
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the improvements and did not
object to their being made.
addresses this point.

In

There is no Utah case that specific 3 liY
Reimann v. Baum, 203 P. 2d 387 (Utah '.~ 19

however, the Utah Supreme Court did address a situation where the
defendant's explanation of good faith was based on a belief that '
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action on the land had been abandoned.

The action had been filed

but plaintiffs did not bring it to trial for four years.

The Utah

supreme Court indicated that the defendant's belief that the action
had been abandoned was insufficient to establish good faith.
Reimann, at 391.
In the case at bar defendants' position is not based
on any affirmative act or statement by the plaintiff, but merely
on an alleged failure to object to defendants' activities on the
land in question.

Even if defendants' contention is accepted as

true, that is not such

a change in circumstances that would

entitle a reasonable person to honestly believe he had obtained
rightful ownership by wrongful means.
(b)

It would be contrary to the intent and purpose

of Utah's Occupying Clailnant's Statute to allow a defendant who
had acquired title by wilful and malicious misconduct against
plaintiff, to maintain a claim for value of improvements against
same plaintiff.

"The doctrine underlying the Occupying Claimant

Statute arose from equity's attempt to make some fair and reasonable adjustment of a mistake made in good faith."
10 Utah 2d 356, 353 P. 2d 463

(_1960).

Alleman v. Miner,

The proposition that a

mistake in good faith can follow from wilful misconduct in acquiring
title, is implausible at best.
equity.

He who seeks equity should do

A claim pursuant to an Occupying Claimant Statute "sounds

in equity."

Reimann v. Baum 203 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah 1949).
In the early case of Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co.,

47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180

(~915),

the Utah Supreme Court noted that

wherein the record it appeared that there was a deliberate

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

attempt to deprive the plaintiff of his property, an entire lack
of good faith was indicated.

Doyle, at 1183.

Very recently the

Utah Supreme Court has ruled that mere notice of an adverse claim
will preclude an occupant from recovering the value of

improvem9~

made subsequent to such notice; apparently this rule applies even
though the occupant might have an honest belief that the adverse
claim was without merit.
Mills, 590 P. 2d 1244

See Hidden Meadows Development Co. v.

(Utah 1979).

Even though Justice Crockett

dissented from the broad rule stated in Hidden Meadows, he notes
that the protection of the Occupying Claimants statute is only
for one who has a "bona fide claim."

Hidden Meadows, at 1251.
th~

It is difficult to conceive a claim that is less "bona fide"

one based on a wilful and wrongful acquisition of title against
the interest of the very same plaintiff the claim is raised

agains~.

(_c) Defendants' contention is that there is a genuine
and material question of fact on the issue of good faith, and
therefore it was error for the trial court to dismiss the
defendants' counterclaim without a trial.

This contention is

based to a large extent on Cl) the defendants' proposition that
the jury finding of wilful and malicious misconduct in 1974,
"would not necessarily be the same or be controlling with respect
to matters occuring" in 1975, and (.2) the plaintiff's alleged
failure to object to defendants' activities in making improvements.
The crucial fact, as noted in argument above, is that
defendants acquired title by wilful and malicious misconduct
against plaintiff.

That issue was fully litigated and reviewed

by the Utah Supreme Court.

Even if plaintiff did not object to
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the making of improvements by defendants, defendants are precluded
by their prior misconduct from maintaining that they were acting
in good faith by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
It is well-settled that the purpose of a summary
judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial
when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party
ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail."
v. Adams, 542 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1975).

Holbrook Co.

In the case at bar the

defendants should not be entitled to re-litigate the issue of how
they acquired title and the prior finding of the jury on that
issue is determinative of the issue of good faith.

There is no

genuine question of fact regarding good faith and the Order of
Dismissal was proper.

"[I]f the party being ruled against could

not prevail when the facts are looked at most favorably for his
position, then summary judgment should be granted."
Marwick Development, Inc.

Grow v.

621 P. 2d 1249 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION

In the present case defendants are precluded, by
their prior misconduct against plaintiff, from maintaining that
they were acting in good faith.

Good faith is an essential element

in a claim pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimant Statute.
such, defendants could not prevail on their favor.

As

An Order of

Dismissal was both prudent and proper in that the court and parties
involved are thereby saved the expense and trouble of a trial at
which the defendants could not prevail.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the lower court's
Order of Dismissal be affirmed and its costs.
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Respectfully submitted,

Robert
for
McRAE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
319 West First South, Suite A
'
Vernal, Utah 84078
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the

foregoi~

postage prepaid, to Cullen Y. Christensen of CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR&

-a

MOODY, attorneys for defendants, 55 East Center Street, P.O. Box
Provo, Utah

84601, on this

day of July, }981.

\i

Zk)~

Robert~
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